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Abstract. Developers of pricing strategies in e-commerce businesses see a wide 
range of opportunities for deploying online price discrimination techniques given 
their ability to track consumers’ online identity and behavior. In theory, an in-
creasing use of personal data enables organizations to show every single con-
sumer their own personalized price, which is determined by the consumer’s char-
acteristics, e.g. age, gender, surfing history, or location. This paper aims to ex-
plore the existence of online price discrimination activities within the German e-
commerce market using a three-method approach. First, inquiring the online re-
tailers via email and investigating their public documents; second, surveying stu-
dents; and third, using a software crawler to simulate surfing activity. Our results 
do not provide any evidence of individualized price discrimination, which, we 
argue, is due to economic and political reasons, not technical reasons. 
Keywords: online price discrimination, tracking, privacy, e-commerce, person-
alization.  
1 Introduction 
The German e-commerce market increases steadily as people are more comfortable and 
willing to purchase goods online1. At the same time, the trend for personalization in 
online retail is growing [1, 2]. We see prospects of e-commerce businesses to collect 
and evaluate personal data such as age, gender, location or device used in order to offer 
specific prices for each customer – called personalized price discrimination. However, 
the public is wary of this development and raises concerns about privacy, tracking and 
consumer protection. Institutions such as the OECD [3], the German Federal Ministry 
of Justice [4], consumer protection initiatives [5, 6], newspapers [7, 8], and the citizens 
question what effects data and algorithms have on consumers. For a debate on price 
discrimination, it is vital to uncover discriminatory practices in order to make interac-
                                                          
1  https://www.statista.com/statistics/453490/e-commerce-retail-revenue-share-germany/ (last 
access 2018-10-12). 
1796
tions with online retailers transparent. Using personal data for setting prices is a sensi-
tive issue, in particular in Germany [9], which could require political or legislative 
measures in the future [10]. 
Previous studies [6–8] explored personalized pricing practices of internationally op-
erating e-commerce retailers, ranging from hotel-booking sites to general online retail-
ers, by using software scrapers. However, the studies do not focus on the German mar-
ket, while existing German studies prefer a manual approach to collect data and have 
small sample size [9–11]. We lack comprehensive information on the current status of 
personalized pricing in German online retail. To close this gap, we suggest triangulating 
results from manual data collection and automatic scraping.  
In this paper, we explore the prevalence of personalized pricing activities performed 
by textile-, electronics- and general stores in the German online retail market. We se-
lected the eleven biggest online retailers by revenue and investigated the presence of 
price discrimination practices in their shops by combining surveys, an automated 
crawler and a discourse analysis. Our study contributes an overview of the tracking 
ecosystem and reports on the existence of personalized pricing activities in German 
online retail. It provides survey items and a software crawler to identify such mecha-
nisms. Our research does not detect any price discrimination practices for the selected 
online retail shops, which, we argue, results from economic and political reasons. 
2 Background 
2.1 Price Discrimination 
Effective pricing strategies are key to increase demand, sales and profit [16]. One pric-
ing strategy is price discrimination (or differential pricing). In general, price discrimi-
nation is defined as a variation of price cost ratio across units or groups of buyers [17]. 
In our context, we define price discrimination as follows: the producer sets varying 
prices, which includes discounts, for an identical product or service for different con-
sumers based on the consumer's characteristics, the time or location of purchase, the 
amount of purchase, or other relevant information [14], [16–18]. The goal is that the 
consumer pays the highest amount that they are willing to pay, i.e. the marginal will-
ingness to pay (WTP) [21]. Price discrimination requires information about consumers 
and the producer’s ability to estimate the consumer’s marginal WTP as accurately as 
possible [19]. In an ideal information environment, the producer can set the price to the 
consumer’s marginal WTP to extract the maximum consumer surplus and maximize 
his profit. Depending on the available information, three degrees of price discrimination 
are distinguished [17, 22]: 
Third degree price discrimination describes different prices for segments of con-
sumers and is the most common form of price discrimination. It requires sociodemo-
graphic information about the consumer [17]. Examples are student or senior citizen 
discounts or regional price variations. Second degree price discrimination is based 
on the amount or quality of a given product or service, usually including consumers’ 
self-selection of amount or quality, to mitigate the difficulty of distinguishing consumer 
types. Examples for amount are volume discounts and examples for quality are airfares, 
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namely business and economy tariffs. First degree price discrimination requires the 
most information as each person gets a personalized price based on their characteristics 
[17]. With detailed information about the consumer, the producer can determine the 
maximum WTP and capture the maximum consumer surplus. Collecting enough infor-
mation to implement first degree price discrimination is difficult. Nonetheless, large-
scale data collection is a first step to enable first degree price discrimination. For ex-
ample, Shiller [23] demonstrated a profitable first degree price discrimination model 
based on 5000 trackable consumer characteristics using behavioral and sociodemo-
graphic traits. Historically, this type of price discrimination is known from the used cars 
or insurance market or from the bazaar in one-to-one transactions. Now, it is possible 
to implement and automate it for all consumers online. 
The degrees are not mutually exclusive [19]. Personalized price discrimination is 
based on the segments of third degree price discrimination, with the ultimate goal to 
achieve a first degree price discrimination. Alternatively, we can explain personalized 
price discrimination as an extreme case of third degree price discrimination with seg-
ments of size one. 
2.2 Conditions and Implementation of Price Discrimination 
Certain conditions must be met to implement price discrimination. A firm (1) needs 
some market power, or consumers buy elsewhere, (2) it needs to control the sale of the 
product or service to set the price and (3) the consumers’ willingness to pay must differ 
from one another [17]. Sufficient information about consumers to distinguish them into 
segments must be available [24, 25]. The segments need to be actionable, substantial, 
accessible, measurable, profitable and stable and are distinguished by behavioral, psy-
chographic, sociodemographic and geographic criteria (for more information see [23–
25] 2). Behavioral criteria include used channels, brand loyalty, buy volume, and previ-
ous purchases. Psychographic criteria include lifestyle, social identity and personality, 
for example, attitude towards risk, expectations of quality of products. Sociodemo-
graphic information includes gender, age, children, job, education, income. Geograph-
ical criteria are distinguished into macro (country, city) and micro (district, street). 
Based on data for each customer, segments can be inferred from quantitative statistical 
analysis such as cluster analysis or machine learning algorithms [26, 27].  
The data is sourced internally or acquired externally. Internal data includes customer 
master data from CRM systems, i.e. data that a consumer enters on the website, for 
example, name, address, city, etc. Other data is based on the actions that customers 
perform, i.e. which articles they view, click, purchase, rate and review. Besides, the 
data includes technical information such as IP address, device, user-agent, or operating 
system. Prevalent shop software solutions offer the functionality to collect this data, 
and to use it for consumer segmentation as well as price discrimination. In addition to 
analyzing internal data, shop solutions offer integrations with external data sources. 
                                                          
2  Market segmentation is a concept that goes beyond price discrimination. 
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External data sources originate either from third party analytics services or trackers3, 
which capture users’ online activities on the web [28] and may provide extended in-
sights [29, 30], or from offline datasets, e.g. voter records, or vehicle owner data. There 
are multiple services available, for example, TruSignal, Adobe Customer Experience 
Cloud, Google Analytics 360, Bluekai, Lotame, and more. However, the market of 
these services is highly concentrated around a few big players, who accumulate data, 
which makes it valuable to acquire, but also sensitive to privacy issues [29–31]. 
2.3 Consumer Perspective 
Growing consumers’ awareness of aggressive tracking and the amount of gathered data 
lead to a discussion on the privacy and ethics of tracking and personalized prices. This 
is exacerbated by the fact, that the big players accumulate most of the data [32, 33], and 
the extent of data collection and sharing is concealed from consumers [30]. 
Since online retailers are not transparent about their pricing mechanisms, it is un-
known if personalized pricing takes place at all, and what type of data significantly 
changes the segmentation of consumers and the resulting prices [15]. The growing data 
collection and the lack of transparency on what consequences particular information 
has, lead to privacy issues and may unsettle consumers [34]. There is an information 
asymmetry between the online retailers and the consumers [31]. Consumers can only 
believe the privacy statements, which are mandated since the EU-GDPR and given by 
online shops, as there are no (easy) neutral ways to check for personalized price dis-
crimination [35]. For a debate on personalized price discrimination in Germany, it is 
crucial to provide empirical means to investigate the current extent of personalized 
price discrimination in online retail. Therefore, we contribute such means to assess the 
extent of personalized price discrimination, empirically, and report on our results. 
3 Related Work 
Previous studies have found little to none price discrimination in online retail. Despite 
checking 200 U.S. shops, Mikians et al. [12] found only few price differences caused 
by a combination of system, sociodemographic and behavioral criteria. Hannak et al. 
[11] explored U.S. shops and the tourism industry using Amazon Mechanical Turk and 
simulated user profiles. They found different prices on nine of sixteen e-commerce 
websites due to changes in system and behavioral criteria. Vissers et al. [36] and Hup-
perich et al. [13] investigated the tourism industry, both using simulated browser fin-
gerprints and user profiles. Vissers et al. did not find any price discrimination, while 
Hupperich et al. find differences based on geographic criteria. For both studies, other 
criteria did not lead to any price changes. Schleusener and Hosell [4] and Kraemer et 
al. [14] focused on the German market using a manual approach. The former found 
                                                          
3  Due to space limitations, we cut the technical description of third-party trackers and the 
tracking ecosystem. Instead, an explanation is provided in [38, 39]. 
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price discrimination in the tourism industry, with system criteria being relevant. Inter-
views with professionals corroborated their results. Kraemer et al. [14] found price dis-
crimination based on geographic and system criteria. 
The findings of previous studies are inconclusive, as some results indicate price dis-
crimination in the tourism industry, while other studies find no price discrimination at 
all. Furthermore, only two studies focus on the German online retail market, leaving it 
underexplored and requiring further research. 
4 Research Design 
To investigate the existence of price discrimination in the online retail market, we select 
the eleven biggest German online e-commerce retailers according to their annual reve-
nue. They are the most relevant shops from a consumer rights perspective, i.e. more 
revenue means more involved consumers, and we choose textile, electronics and gen-
eral stores, because they are less explored compared to the tourism industry. First, we 
analyze the discourse on price discrimination using public information on the selected 
shops, shop software vendors, tracking providers followed by contacting them. Second, 
we build a survey based on the found information, which captures personal user infor-
mation. Test persons filled out the survey and use their personal devices to check prices 
in each shop, manually. Third, we use an automated software crawler, which simulates 
user activity and user profiles, to check the prices in each shop. 
Table 1. Selected Online Shops (Revenue in Million EUR in 2015)4 
Shop Revenue Sector Shop Revenue Sector 
amazon.de 7.790,60 General tchibo.de 450,00 General  
otto.de 2.300,00 General conrad.de 433,20 General 
zalando.de  1.031,80 Textile alternate.de 376,70 General 
notebooksbilliger.de 610,90 Electronic hm.de 344,60 Textile 
cyberport.de 491,30 Electronic esprit.de 342,00 Textile 
bonprix.de 484,70 Textile       
 
First, for the discourse analysis, we investigate the most prevalent trackers among 
the top 20 worldwide [33, 37] and observe the involved actors as well as their activities. 
We evaluate public documents on their websites in order to understand what, how and 
why they track the information of consumers in their services. Besides the trackers, we 
look at the three biggest standard shop software by market share in 2017 (Shopify, 
WooCommerce, Magento)5. We evaluate their websites for functionality related to 
tracking, consumer segmentation and price discrimination; and what consumer criteria 
the software makes use of. We also contact them directly, and assess available third 
                                                          
4  http://www.statista-research.com/wp-content/uploads/Infografik_Top-100-On-
lineshops_D.pdf (last access 2018-10-09). 
5  https://www.statista.com/statistics/710207/worldwide-e-commerce-platforms-market-share 
(last access 2018-10-09). 
The market share has changed since we collected the data. 
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party addons for each shop software. According to the EU-GDPR, e-commerce com-
panies have to disclose how they obtain, process and use personal citizens' information 
as well as the purposes of doing so. This implies that companies are to disclose whether 
they perform any kind of price discrimination activities using personal data of custom-
ers. Using this opportunity, we assess the privacy notices of each online shop and con-
tact the data protection departments of each online shop. The question that we for-
warded to the data protection departments is: 
“Due to the EU-GDPR, we would like to inquire, whether and in which way personal 
data influences the determination of visible prices, including potential discounts or 
vouchers (also via mail or email), in your online shop.” (Translated from the original 
German statement). 
Second, the three checked shop software packages provide the functionality to im-
plement personalized price discrimination, but there is no information if any of the 
shops use this feature. Only the number of reviews hints that the features may be used, 
so we use the criteria collected from the discourse analysis to develop a survey. The 
survey consists of two parts. The first part is a list of 20 hyperlinks to products of the 
selected shops. The second part asks for behavioral and sociodemographic criteria as 
well as system attributes as seen in Table 3. We distributed the survey to four different 
student groups in Germany depicted in Table 2. The students checked the prices of the 
20 selected products with their own devices, browser settings, and accounts and filled 
out the survey accordingly. Some students used proxies and VPNs, but the most com-
mon types of connection were University WiFi and mobile data. Due to logistical is-
sues, we were unable to record the type of connection. 
Table 2. Samples  
Round Group Size 
1st round 
International students  12 
PhD students 14 
2nd round Bachelor students 13 
3rd round Bachelor students 22 
 
Table 3. Survey Items 
Survey Items 
Age Manufacturer 
Gender Hobby 
Device Type Previous Visits 
Operating System Previous Purchases 
Language Social Media Logins 
Apps  
 
 
Within the groups, at least 10 different participants checked each product’s price. 
All checks were conducted in one session at the same time, to rule out prices changes 
over time. Between the groups, different products and shops were tested to increase the 
breadth of the study. The participants recorded all prices in EUR, which we later ana-
lyzed. 
Third, due to the logistics of conducting a survey, we develop an automated soft-
ware to triangulate our findings based on [12, 13]. The goal of the software is to simu-
late ordinary user activity for seven days, to build five online user profile and accumu-
late cookies. After seven days, it checks the prices using the five profiles. 
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Table 4. Crawler Profiles 
Profile Keywords 
Profile1 Frankfurt Football 
Profile2 Tennis Dortmund 
Profile3 Horseriding München 
Profile4 Cooking News 
Profile5 Gucci Rolex 
 
Table 5. Actions for Profile Simulation 
Website Engagement Actions 
twitter click and like 
reddit click, like and subscribe 
facebook click, view and like 
google click, scroll and wait 
bild click, scroll and wait 
youtube click, view and like 
 
 
Each user profile is generated from two keywords (Table 4) that the crawler uses to 
engage on search, news and social media sites (Table 5), and is assigned a distinct proxy 
to simulate geographic location. The software is implemented in Python using Selenium 
with the Firefox driver and the source code is available on GitHub. 
5 Findings 
Discourse Results. The tracking ecosystem sees actors with varying primary activities, 
from data management platforms to marketing solutions, who track consumers’ infor-
mation. We found that most of them have dedicated services that perform tracking. The 
tracked data is distinguished into sociodemographic, behavioral and system criteria, 
sourced internally and externally. The purposes of tracking by the actors overlap. The 
criteria in Table 6 depicts what data the clients of the actors can acquire, not what data 
the firms behind the services collect and analyze. 
Table 6. Players in Tracking and Targeted Analytics. Legend: 
Google Analytics 360G, Facebook AnalyticsF, Amazon PinpointP, 
Adobe TargetT, OptimizelyO, SAP Hybris Marketing CloudH. 
Main Service Data Management PlatformG, AdvertisingG,F,O, Marketing SolutionT,H 
Data Sources InternalG,F,P,T,O,H, Across ToolsG,P, ExternalG,F,P,T,O,H, CSVG 
Sociodemographic AgeG,F,P, GenderG,F, LocationG,F,P,T,O, NameH, AddressH, OtherH 
Behavioral Surf HistoryG,P,O, LifestyleG,P,H, InterestsG,P,H, # of VisitsP, Time of 
VisitT,O, ReferrerO, PurchasesT,H, PaymentsT,H, Clicked ads G, On-site 
ActivityO,H 
System IP addressG,F,T,O, DeviceG,P,O, ManufacturerP,O, BrowserF,T,O, Operating 
SystemF,P,T,O, Screen sizeT, LanguageT,O 
Purpose SegmentationG,P,O,H, Ad EffectivenessF,T,O,H, EngagementT,O,H, Site Opti-
mizationT,O, Loyalty ManagementT,H 
 
We reached out to the three online shop vendors to inquire whether their software 
supports personalized price discrimination. Although it is not a core functionality of 
Shopify and WooCommerce, it is feasible through addons. For Shopify, multiple ad-
dons are available, for example, “Customer-Specific Pricing”, “Storakle”, or “Segment 
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Builder”, while for WooCommerce, we only found “WP Statistics”. Magento has ad-
vanced customer segmentation built-in, which can be enhanced by the addon “Prices 
per Customer”. Magento also allows the integration of external data, for example, the 
import of offline purchase data. 
We found that all of the observed online retailers authored a privacy declaration, in 
which they depict data use for targeted advertising, statistics and server operations, but 
not for pricing purposes. After inquiring about the use of price discrimination via email, 
the majority of the contacted online retailers (7) denied usage of discrimination activi-
ties towards customers based on their personal data, while Otto.de, Bonprix.de, hm.de 
and Amazon.de did not answer the mail at all. Tchibo.de and Esprit.de state that they 
select consumers for discounts and gifts based on personal data and previous purchases, 
i.e. they engage in indirect price discrimination based on ex post discounts. 
Survey Results. Due to space limitations, we do not report all descriptive statistics 
in detail. We only report them for selected items and only the top three values: n=61, 
age (M=24.84; SD=4.5), gender6 (64% male; 18% female), device type (34% Win-
dows; 31% Android; 13% iOS), and language (62% German; 26% English; 12% other). 
Most selected hobbies are travelling (46%), technology (41%) and sports (20%) and 
most visited shops include Amazon.de (43%), Zalando.de (28%) and Notebooks-
billiger.de (25%). Top installed apps are YouTube (56%), Facebook (46%) and Insta-
gram (38%). The first round with 26 international and PhD students showed a few in-
significant prices differences. For four distinct users, prices differed by 9.00 EUR, 2.00 
EUR, 0.05 EUR and 0.09 EUR on Otto.de, Zalando.de and Cyberport.de (last two). For 
the biggest difference, 9.00 EUR and 2.00 EUR, we compared the survey characteris-
tics of the users with differing prices. Although, both of them were using mobile de-
vices, the model and language of those devices were distinct from the other test persons. 
The second round of tests, in which 13 bachelor students participated, showed two dif-
ferences in prices at 0.05 EUR and 0.60 EUR for Tchibo.de and Alternate.de. The last 
round with 22 bachelor students found only one instance of price differentiation by 0.10 
EUR on Amazon.de. Overall, we tested 93 prices of products. Due to insufficient cases 
of price differentiation – presumably caused by transcription errors – the results do not 
substantiate the existence of systematic online price discrimination in the observed 
online retailers. 
Crawler Results. Utilizing the crawler, we scraped the prices of 865 products with 
each of the five profiles, totaling 4325 checks in 27 sessions. We crawled all prices 
within the sessions at the same time, while the different sessions took place throughout 
one month. The shops Notebooksbilliger.de, Hm.de and Conrad.de are missing in the 
results due to their bot protection. They recognized our crawler and prevented the page 
load and scraping of prices. To add another electronics store, we crawled Medi-
amarkt.de instead. Apart from software errors, when the website layout changed and 
the scraper failed to extract the correct price, we did not find a single difference in 
prices in the entire data set for any of the selected products and shops. 
                                                          
6  Eleven participants did not fill out their gender. 
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6 Discussion 
Our results are consistent with previous studies and show that personalized price dis-
crimination is not widely used in online shops. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the prac-
tices of the tourism industry [4, 11, 13], the implementation of personalized price dis-
crimination is generally feasible. The first key condition to implement it, is sufficient 
information on the consumers to distinguish them into segments [19, 24, 25]. Based on 
the current data collection means, enough information on the consumers is available to 
derive such segments and to implement third degree price discrimination [17, 22]. 
Schleusener and Hosell [4] hypothesize a reason for the lack of personalized price dis-
crimination may be the lack of technical expertise by German online retailers. However, 
our results show that all standard software packages provide the means to collect inter-
nal data and offer integrations with external data providers. Furthermore, if the shops 
have the expertise to develop a custom shop software, then they have the expertise to 
implement consumer segmentation and price discrimination. Hence, we argue that the 
lack of expertise is not the reason for the non-deployment of price discrimination prac-
tices. 
Instead of technical obstacles, the reasons may be economical. The data providers 
do not disclose any prices on their websites, but acquiring external data may be costly 
compared to the value it provides, so acquiring external data may not be profitable for 
online shops. Yet, this does not explain the lack of price discrimination using internal 
data. As stated in the second condition for price discrimination [17], the retailer needs 
market power, or consumers will switch to other shops, if the same products are offered 
elsewhere. This is exacerbated by readily available online search. Another reason may 
be that employing personalized price discrimination can hurt the brand [4], because 
changing prices can lower the perceived price fairness of consumers [16]. 
Online retailers acquiring and exchanging customer data with third parties (including 
outside of EU legislation), without knowledge by the consumers may bring about dis-
satisfaction [10]. German citizens, compared to other countries and cultures, are sensi-
tive to privacy issues, in particular since the EU-GDPR is effective [9]. The threat of 
legal action by consumer protection initiatives, and potential repercussions due to mis-
treatment or theft of data, may bar online retailers from implementing personalized 
price discrimination. It may be too risky to lose the trust of consumers and their brand 
value over the comparatively small profits, delivered by personalized price discrimina-
tion practices. 
We conclude that the reasons for the lack of price discrimination in Germany are not 
technical, rather it must be for economic and political reasons. The digitalization, paired 
with intransparency of data collection and usage, especially by international players, 
brings rapid changes and means that price discrimination can start to occur any time. 
Thus, it is imperative to monitor potential price discrimination continuously. In a bigger 
project, our software can be improved with better monitoring abilities to provide ongo-
ing assessment of personalized price discrimination. 
We also received anecdotal references from colleagues and consultants, which we 
were not able to corroborate. Contrary to our findings, three retail and e-commerce 
consultancies claimed that their clients are engaging in online price discrimination. We 
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assume that either their clients have not rolled out any price discrimination yet, or they 
are in pre-testing, or they are not part of our selected shops, or our methods did not 
detect them. 
7 Conclusion 
In previous studies, German shops were not widely tested using surveys and automated 
scraping, and the ecosystem with its players was not systematically explored. Hence, 
our study makes a valuable contribution, as we investigate the prevalence of personal-
ized price discrimination practices in the German e-commerce market through triangu-
lation. By using three different methods, we reach a holistic picture of the ecosystem, 
its players and their use and exchange of data for the purpose of price discrimination. 
Contrary to our expectations, the results of our study do not substantiate that online 
retailers in Germany perform online price discrimination practices. In particular, the 
discourse analysis shows that the technical possibilities for price discrimination are 
widely available. Yet, both the survey and the crawler results show no evidence of price 
discrimination by the tested online shops. As discussed, we argue that this is due to 
political and economic reasons, not because of technical reasons. 
The discourse analysis is limited to the official documentation, references and re-
sponses of the players. The survey and crawler are restricted by the sample size. Other 
limitations include the colocation of the survey participants and the usage of University 
Wi-Fi, since one of the characteristics that was proven to alter prices within consumers 
is the geographic location. Some participants made errors while transcribing prices. 
Several shops detected the crawler as a bot. We used free proxies, which might be 
blacklisted and negatively affect the price scraping, and the crawler directly accessed 
the product pages and did not traverse the shop websites. Nevertheless, our results 
match those observed in earlier studies. Future iterations of this experiment should be 
conducted with larger sample size and an improved crawler. The reasons for price dis-
crimination can be further explored by conducting expert interviews. 
Various institutions such as the OECD [3], the German Federal Ministry of Justice 
and Consumer Protection [4], consumer protection initiatives [5, 6], newspapers [7, 8], 
and most importantly, the German citizens and consumers recognized price discrimi-
nation as a major concern. Personalized price discrimination is a prime example of the 
algorithmization and digitalization of society and economy, and what effects data and 
algorithms may have on its people. Due to the digitalization and rapid changes of the 
online ecosystem, we encourage a continuous assessment of price discrimination prac-
tices in the future. 
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